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RESURRECTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: ENFORCEMENT OF EPA’S 
DISPARATE-IMPACT REGULATIONS 
THROUGH CLEAN AIR ACT  
CITIZEN SUITS 
Brian Crossman*
Abstract: The environmental justice movement aims to eradicate dispa-
rate siting of environmental hazards in minority and low-income com-
munities. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 
environmental justice advocates had focused their efforts on enforce-
ment of EPA’s disparate-impact regulations. These regulations prohibit 
recipients of federal funding from administering any program that has 
the effect of racial discrimination. However, the Sandoval decision de-
clared that no private right of action existed to enforce the regulations. 
Despite this signiªcant setback, the regulations may still be enforceable 
in circumstances where an appropriate statutory handle exists. For ex-
ample, section 110(a)(2)(E) of the Clean Air Act requires states to pro-
vide assurances that their plans comply with federal law. To the extent 
the disparate-impact regulations remain valid federal law, they may be 
enforced through actions to compel EPA to reject plans that do not in-
clude the requisite assurances. This Note explores the substantive and 
procedural issues surrounding such actions. 
Introduction 
 At just over two decades old, the environmental justice move-
ment is a relatively young movement.1 Having arisen in response to 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004–05. 
B.A., Pomona College, 2001. I would like to thank the past and present editorial staffs for 
their invaluable assistance, as well as Professor Zygmunt Plater, without whom this Note 
would not have been possible. I also owe a debt of gratitude to David Galalis for introduc-
ing me to this topic and for his helpful comments on earlier drafts. This Note has 
beneªted immensely from all of their contributions. 
1 See, e.g., James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice 
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 125, 140–41 (1994); Ei-
leen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to 
Environmental Justice, 22 Ecology L.Q. 1, 9 (1995). The environmental justice movement 
did not gain national recognition until 1982. In that year, the U.S. General Accounting 
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the phenomenon known as “environmental racism,”2 the environ-
mental justice movement merged two previously isolated social prob-
lems: environmental deterioration and racial injustice.3 The move-
ment has gained considerable momentum as minority and low-
income communities continue to bear a disproportionate burden of 
environmental hazards, as compared to more afºuent, Caucasian 
communities.4 The disparity arose in large part because of NIMBY-
ism, the “not-in-my-backyard” mentality most communities feel when 
faced with the siting of an environmental hazard.5 Because of the di-
minished resources and the disenfranchisement of minority and low-
income communities, they are frequently subjected to a signiªcantly 
greater proportion of environmental hazards.6
 Disproportionate environmental burdens generally manifest 
themselves in three distinct ways: (1) disparate siting and permitting 
of hazardous facilities; (2) disparate enforcement of environmental 
statutes and regulations; and (3) disparate remediation of contami-
nated sites.7 Not surprisingly, these communities also suffer from de-
                                                                                                                      
Ofªce (GAO) issued a report in response to demonstrations objecting to the siting of a 
polychlorinated biphenyl landªll in a predominately African American county in North 
Carolina. U.S. Gen. Accounting Ofªce, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting of Hazardous 
Waste Landªlls and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Sur-
rounding Communities 1, 3 ( June 1, 1983), http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf. 
The study found that three of the four major hazardous waste facilities in the county were 
located in predominately African American communities, even though African Americans 
comprised only one-ªfth of the region’s population. Id. at 3; Gauna, supra, at 9. Alterna-
tively, some commentators have suggested that the movement may have begun with a law-
suit ªled in Texas in 1979. See Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under 
Title VI, Section 602: Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
631, 633 (2000). Though unsuccessful, the lawsuit, which used § 1983 to challenge the 
siting of a waste facility in a predominately African American community, served as a cata-
lyst for future environmental justice litigation See id. at 633–34. 
2 See Gauna, supra note 1, at 2 & n.1. 
3 Id. at 2–3. 
4 See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in Unequal Protection: Envi-
ronmental Justice and Communities of Color 3, 6 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994). 
5 Gauna, supra note 1, at 31–32; E. Andrew Long, Comment, Protection of Minority Envi-
ronmental Interests in the Administrative Process: A Critical Analysis of the EPA’s Guidance for Com-
plaints Under Title VI, 39 Willamette L. Rev. 1163, 1166 (2003). 
6 Gauna, supra note 1, at 32; Long, supra note 5, at 1166–67. Alternatively, or perhaps 
additionally, the disparity is thought to arise from unconscious racial discrimination: stud-
ies have suggested that the civil rights developments of the last half-century have not 
eliminated environmental discrimination in political decisionmaking. Long, supra note 5, 
at 1167. 
7 David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. 
Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
61, 63 (2004). 
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teriorated health and increased mortality rates as a result of these 
“disparate impacts.”8 Environmental justice attempts to resolve this 
disparity by incorporating social equity considerations into environ-
mental decisionmaking and enforcement.9
 While early environmental justice litigation focused on claims 
brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,10 a more recent trend has been to bring private actions under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Speciªcally, past suits have 
sought to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to EPA’s Title VI author-
ity.12 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, however—both holding that Title VI regulations 
confer no implied right of action13—have severely restricted, if not alto-
gether eliminated, citizens’ ability to privately enforce these regulations. 
 Although these recent decisions have led many commentators to 
believe that achievement of environmental justice through private en-
forcement of disparate-impact regulations has been foreclosed,14 there 
is reason to believe that these disparate-impact regulations may still be 
privately enforceable in limited circumstances where Congress has pro-
vided an appropriate statutory “handle.”15 One such handle may be 
section 110(a)(2)(E) of the Clean Air Act (CAA),16 which requires 
each state to provide assurances, prior to EPA approval, that the state is 
not prohibited by federal law from carrying out its proposed state im-
                                                                                                                      
8 U.S. Gen. Accounting Ofªce, GAO/RCED-95-84, Hazardous and Nonhazard-
ous Waste: Demographics of People Living near Waste Facilities 56, 59–60 ( June 
1995), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154854.pdf; Lisa S. Core, Note, Alexander v. San-
doval: Why a Supreme Court Case About Driver’s Licenses Matters to Environmental Justice Advo-
cates, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 191, 191 n.2 (2002). 
9 See, e.g., Gauna, supra note 1, at 30; Core, supra note 8, at 191–92. 
10 Core, supra note 8, at 194 & n.16. 
11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601–602, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codiªed 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2000)). 
12 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. 
N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) [South Camden III]; Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 
974 (1998). 
13 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 790–91. 
14 See, e.g., Seth Schoªeld, Achieving Environmental Justice Through Title VI: Is It a Dead 
End?, 26 Vt. L. Rev. 905, 925–26 (2002); Core, supra note 8, at 242; Suzanne Smith, Note, 
Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the Courtroom, 
12 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 223, 256 (2002). 
15 See discussion infra Part II. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (2000). 
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plementation plan (SIP).17 Assuming arguendo that EPA’s disparate-
impact regulations constitute valid federal law,18 the provision prohibits 
EPA from approving portions of SIPs that would result in racial dis-
crimination.19 Should such a SIP be approved, the CAA’s citizen suit 
provision could arguably provide a means of compelling the Adminis-
trator to reject SIPs found to violate section 110(a)(2)(E).20
 This Note will outline the structure and arguments of such a citi-
zen suit. Part I.A brieºy explores the history of the environmental jus-
tice movement, focusing on enforcement mechanisms. Part I.B exam-
ines the recent developments regarding implied rights of action, 
including the recent limitations imposed by decisions in the Supreme 
Court and the Third Circuit. Part II then suggests that while these re-
cent decisions have led many to believe that EPA’s disparate-impact 
regulations are no longer privately enforceable, there may be a statu-
tory avenue through which these regulations can still be privately en-
forced: section 110(a)(2)(E) and the citizen suit provision of the 
CAA. Finally, Part III explores the substantive and practical challenges 
that may be faced in enforcing these regulations via a CAA citizen 
suit. The Note ultimately concludes that there are strong legal argu-
ments to be made that EPA must reject SIPs that fail to provide neces-
sary assurances of their compliance with disparate-impact regulations, 
and that EPA can therefore be compelled to do so through citizen-
initiated litigation. 
I. History of Environmental Justice Advocacy 
 When the environmental justice movement began, advocates be-
lieved that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which provides that “no state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws,”21 was plaintiffs’ best strategy for challenging envi-
ronmentally discriminatory action.22 Such constitutionally based litiga-
tion, however, posed a unique obstacle due to the requirement that a 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. 
18 See discussion infra Part II.A and note 165. 
19 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
20 See discussion infra Parts II.B, III. 
21 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
22 Core, supra note 8, at 194 & n.16 (noting several cases that challenged, on Equal 
Protection grounds, decisions to site environmentally hazardous facilities in minority 
communities). 
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plaintiff prove discriminatory intent.23 In other words, a plaintiff was 
required to show that defendants acted with an explicit racially dis-
criminatory purpose.24 Even where the effects of state action are dis-
criminatory, however, it is nearly impossible to show that the state 
acted with the express intent of causing such discrimination25— in-
deed, in many cases, states genuinely do not intend the discriminatory 
effects of their policies. Yet, regardless of whether the discriminatory 
distribution of environmental harm is intended or not, the effect is the 
same, and the need for a remedy just as pressing. 
 Given the difªculty of proving discriminatory intent, environ-
mental justice plaintiffs shifted their focus to certain regulations prom-
ulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,26 which explicitly 
proscribed disparate impacts, regardless of intent.27 Title VI consists of 
two parts, both of instrumental value to environmental justice: section 
601 prohibits agencies that receive any kind of federal ªnancial assis-
tance from discriminating against individuals based on race;28 section 
602 states that agencies are “directed to effectuate the provisions of sec-
tion [601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general appli-
cability.”29 Pursuant to this authority, in 1973 EPA promulgated “dispa-
rate-impact” regulations that prohibited recipients of EPA funding 
from engaging in acts that had discriminatory effects.30
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. at 194–95. 
24 Colopy, supra note 1, at 146. 
25 Core, supra note 8, at 194–95; see also Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: 
The Past, the Present, and Back to the Future, 42 Nat. Resources J. 701, 704 (2002) (noting 
that, in studies demonstrating the existence of environmental racism, “[f]or obvious rea-
sons, direct evidence of racial targeting is nowhere to be found”). 
26 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601–602, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codiªed 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2000)). 
27 See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in The Law of Environmental Justice 23, 24 (Mi-
chael B. Gerrard ed., 1999); Core, supra note 8, at 197–99. 
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the beneªts of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal ªnancial 
assistance.” Id. 
29 Id. § 2000d-1. 
30 Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Assistance from the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2004). The regulation reads: 
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program or ac-
tivity which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of 
their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or sub-
stantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program or activity 
with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex. 
Id. 
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 Private litigation under EPA disparate-impact regulations ap-
peared at one time to be a promising avenue for the environmental 
justice movement.31 The reduced burden meant that plaintiffs 
needed only to allege a causal connection between a facially neutral 
policy and a disproportionate and adverse impact on minorities.32 
However, the strategy was short-lived.33 In 2001, the Supreme Court 
held in Alexander v. Sandoval that there was no implied private right of 
action to directly enforce agencies’ Title VI disparate-impact regula-
tions.34 Efforts to privately enforce the regulations were further cur-
tailed following a decision in the Third Circuit holding that EPA’s 
disparate-impact regulations are not enforceable under § 1983 ei-
ther.35
A. Avenues of Enforcement 
1. Administrative Enforcement 
 While a private individual’s right to administrative adjudication 
has not been limited by the courts, there is some question as to the 
efªciency and effectiveness of the administrative process.36 In 1993, 
EPA created the Ofªce of Civil Rights (OCR) at the urging of Presi-
dent William Jefferson Clinton, who shortly thereafter promulgated 
an Executive Order on environmental justice.37 Executive Order 
12,898 directed agencies to make environmental justice a priority by 
instructing them to incorporate environmental justice aims into their 
missions and to speciªcally address their Title VI responsibilities.38 
OCR was created with the intent that it would assist in securing com-
pliance with EPA’s disparate-impact regulations.39
                                                                                                                      
31 See Core, supra note 8, at 197–99. 
32 E.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff in a Title VI 
disparate impact suit bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that a fa-
cially neutral practice has resulted in a racial disparity.”). 
33 See Core, supra note 8, at 236, 242. 
34 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
35 See South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 790–91 (3d Cir. 2001). 
36 See, e.g., Worsham, supra note 1, at 647–48. 
37 See id. at 647. 
38 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
39 See Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Assistance from 
the Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.105 (2004). 
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 An individual who believes there has been a violation of EPA’s 
disparate-impact regulations may ªle a complaint with OCR.40 Follow-
ing the ªling of a compliant, OCR is required to respond within 
twenty days by accepting, rejecting, or forwarding the complaint to 
the appropriate federal agency.41 If accepted, OCR will notify the in-
volved parties and give each an opportunity to respond in writing to 
the alleged violations.42 Once the parties have had a chance to re-
spond to the complaint, informal resolution is attempted.43 If unsuc-
cessful, OCR will notify the alleged violator of the preliminary ªnding 
of noncompliance, advise the party how voluntary compliance might 
be achieved, and inform the party of its right to engage in compliance 
negotiation.44 The alleged violator then has ªfty days to either comply 
with OCR’s recommendations or challenge the preliminary ªnding of 
noncompliance.45 Should the recipient fail to meet this deadline, 
OCR sends the violator and the Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights a formal determination of noncompliance.46 The party found 
to be noncompliant then has ten days from the receipt of OCR’s for-
mal determination to voluntarily comply; otherwise, OCR may begin a 
proceeding to terminate the party’s EPA funding.47
 Among the advantages to administrative enforcement is that the 
process is relatively easy and inexpensive to commence.48 To initiate 
administrative review, all a complainant needs to do is send a letter to 
OCR alleging discrimination by a recipient of federal funding.49 EPA 
then conducts the investigation at its own expense.50 Though legal 
counsel may be helpful to a complainant, it is not necessary.51 There 
are, however, many signiªcant drawbacks to relying on administrative 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. § 7.120(a). The complaint must be ªled within 180 days of the alleged discrimi-
natory act. Id. § 7.120(b)(2). 
41 Id. § 7.120(d)(1)(i). 
42 Id. § 7.120(d)(1)(ii). The alleged violator has 30 days to submit a response. Id. 
§ 7.120(d)(1)(iii). 
43 Id. § 7.120(d)(2)(i). 
44 Id. § 7.115(c)(1)(i)–(iii). 
45 Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Assistance from the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(d)(1)–(2) (2004). 
46 Id. § 7.115(d)(2). 
47 Id. §§ 7.115(e), 7.130(a)–(b). 
48 See Clifford Rechtschaffen & Eileen Gauna, Environmental Justice: Law, 
Policy, and Regulation 353 (2002); Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action 
Under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 Co-
lum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 24 (1999). 
49 Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 353. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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enforcement. First and foremost, OCR has been criticized for its inef-
fectiveness and inefªciency in providing victims of Title VI discrimina-
tion adequate relief, and for the secrecy of its investigations.52 Be-
tween September 1993 and August 1998, OCR came to no conclusion 
on at least one in every four complaints ªled.53 Furthermore, it did 
not ªnd that a single complaint had established a violation of Title 
VI.54 As of 2002, 121 claims had been ªled with OCR, but only one 
case had been decided on its merits after an investigation.55 Such 
inefªciency and ineffectiveness is likely the result of an overworked 
and under-resourced staff.56 OCR, like similar civil rights ofªces in 
other agencies, is responsible for addressing all civil rights claims, not 
just those arising under Title VI. The enactment of subsequent civil 
rights statutes has led to an increase in the number of complaints 
ªled, an increase that has not been matched by agency stafªng or 
congressional appropriation.57
 Another drawback to administrative enforcement is that, aside 
from providing speciªc documentation and information at EPA’s re-
quest, a complainant has no right to participate in the agency’s investi-
gation.58 Furthermore, there is also some question as to how vigorously 
EPA can be expected to pursue funding termination.59 Understandably, 
EPA is reluctant to remove federal funding that is used to reduce pollu-
tion.60 Ironically, termination of funding could adversely affect the very 
                                                                                                                      
52 Worsham, supra note 1, at 647–48. 
53 Id. at 648. Of the 58 complaints ªled in this period, no conclusion was reached in at 
least 15 of them. Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 354. The one decision reached was in 
the Select Steel case, where EPA dismissed the Title VI claim, ªnding that no adverse dis-
criminatory effect would accrue from a challenged facility otherwise in compliance with 
air quality standards. See Ofªce of Civil Rights, EPA, File No. 5R-98-R5, Investigative 
Report for Title VI Administrative Complaint 42, http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/ 
docs/ssdec_ir.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
56 See Mank, supra note 27, at 27; Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Adminis-
trative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1774, 1778 (2003). 
57 Note, supra note 56, at 1778. 
58 Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 353; Mank, supra note 48, at 22. 
59 See Mank, supra note 48, at 17–18; Long, supra note 5, at 1171. 
60 See Mank, supra note 48, at 17–18; Colopy, supra note 1, at 182 n.279; Long, supra note 
5, at 1171. In fact, EPA at times has admitted as much. Colopy, supra note 1, at 182 n.279. In 
1971, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus acknowledged that EPA’s reluctance to en-
force compliance with Title VI stemmed from the agency’s belief that many regulated indus-
tries might view a termination of funding as a beneªt and excuse not to comply with envi-
ronmental regulations. Id. In Administrator Ruckelshaus’s words: “[T]here are circumstances 
that can arise where it would seem that our ability to achieve the purposes of the Civil Rights 
Act ºies in the face of our mandate by Congress to insure that water quality standards are 
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minority groups OCR is charged with protecting, providing a further 
disincentive for EPA to enforce disparate-impact regulations to their 
fullest extent.61
 Recently, there have been indications that EPA may have a re-
newed commitment to environmental justice,62 though many are still 
skeptical.63 In June 2000, EPA jointly published two Title VI guidance 
reports intended to assist funding recipients with their permitting pro-
grams and outlining procedures for investigating Title VI administra-
tive complaints.64 Particularly encouraging was the guidance reports’ 
statement that, “[funding recipients] are required to operate [their] 
programs in compliance with the non-discrimination requirements of 
Title VI and EPA’s implementing regulations.”65 At least one court has 
taken notice of this requirement.66 Commentators, however, have criti-
cized the guidance reports as creating, rather than diminishing, obsta-
cles to Title VI enforcement by failing to account for resource dispari-
ties and favoring funding recipients at nearly every phase of the 
administrative process.67
 As an alternative to administrative enforcement, many Title VI 
plaintiffs have sought judicial enforcement of EPA’s disparate-impact 
regulations through private litigation. While private litigation has 
been crucial to the environmental justice movement, and to Title VI 
enforcement in particular, in light of recent federal decisions, such 
litigation has been severely limited.68
                                                                                                                      
complied with.” Id.; see also Colopy, supra note 1, at 186 n.301 (noting that over 20 years later 
in 1993, EPA clariªed that Ruckelshaus’s comments were not meant to imply that Title VI or 
any other civil rights provisions were inapplicable to EPA). 
61 See Mank, supra note 48, at 18. 
62 See Kyle W. La Londe, Who Wants to Be an Environmental Justice Advocate?: Options for 
Bringing an Environmental Justice Complaint in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval, 31 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 27, 38 n.76 (noting that in 2001, then-Administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman declared EPA to have “a ªrm commitment to the issue of environmental justice 
and its integration into all programs, policies, and activities, consistent with existing envi-
ronmental laws”). 
63 See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
64 Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental 
Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for Investi-
gating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investiga-
tion Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 ( June 27, 2000). 
65 Id. at 39,657. 
66 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 478 
(D.N.J. 2001) [South Camden I]. 
67 See Long, supra note 5, at 1213. 
68 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001); South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 
790–91 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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2. Judicial Enforcement 
 Judicial enforcement is often thought to better address the con-
cerns of environmental justice complainants than administrative en-
forcement, but it is also not without its drawbacks.69 Among the ad-
vantages is that a litigant has far more rights than an administrative 
complainant, including the ability to direct one’s own investigation 
and potentially obtain equitable relief.70 A Title VI plaintiff is also en-
titled to reasonable attorney fees.71 Additionally, legal action may pro-
voke political opposition to a particular project or siting decision in 
ways that administrative investigations cannot.72 The high cost of legal 
action, however, can act as a deterrent to the pursuit of court en-
forcement.73 Furthermore, given the courts’ somewhat “fractured”74 
history of Title VI regulation, judicial enforcement presents signiª-
cant risks.75 It would appear though, particularly given the criticism of 
administrative enforcement, that the beneªts of seeking court en-
forcement far outweigh the burdens.76
 The ªrst major Supreme Court treatment of Title VI with rele-
vance to the disparate-impact regulation debate was Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke.77 The Bakke decision is often thought to 
have declared that Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination, 
for the Court stated that “Title VI must be held to proscribe only 
those racial classiªcations that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment.”78 A year later the Court acknowl-
                                                                                                                      
69 See Mank, supra note 48, at 23–24. 
70 Id. at 24. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. 
74 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 298 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (refer-
ring speciªcally to the Court’s multitude of opinions in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). 
75 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 354. 
76 Mank, supra note 48, at 23–24. This fact notwithstanding, the majority of Title VI en-
forcement is still brought administratively. Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 
354. 
77 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
78 Id. at 287. But see discussion infra Part II.A. Subsequent decisions, including Sando-
val, have interpreted this statement to limit Title VI’s protection to intentional discrimina-
tion, reasoning that, since the Equal Protection Clause only prohibits intentional discrimi-
nation, so too does Title VI. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280–81. At least one commentator has 
observed, however, that this statement was made in dicta and that Bakke in fact does not 
reºect any congressional intent to limit the scope of Title VI to racial classiªcations that 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Galalis, supra note 7, at 89–92; discussion 
infra Part II.A. Assuming arguendo, however, that Congress did intend to limit Title VI’s 
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edged, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, that to the extent that Title 
VI regulations provided protection against discrimination, be it dispa-
rate-impact and/or intentional discrimination, they created a private 
right of action to enforce those protections.79 Despite these decisions, 
the scope of Title VI protections was hardly settled. In 1983, the Court 
revisited the Bakke debate in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission 
of New York.80 The Court’s decision in Guardians lacked a majority 
opinion and instead consisted of ªve separate and overlapping opin-
ions, each differing slightly on the scope of the Title VI regulations.81 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell speculated that, “[o]ur 
opinions today will further confuse rather than guide.”82 What some 
commentators have taken from Guardians is that among the various 
opinions, ªve justices implicitly agreed that Title VI regulations could 
prohibit disparate-impact discrimination.83 However, since this was 
                                                                                                                      
prohibition to racial classiªcations that violate equal protection, it still cannot be said that 
this prohibition is limited to intentional acts—Title VI was enacted before Washington v. 
Davis limited the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition to intentional discrimination. Ga-
lalis, supra note 7, at 91–92. 
79 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694, 696 (1979) (analogizing the Title IX 
issue before them to Title VI, the Court noted that “[i]n 1972 when Title IX was enacted, 
the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy”). 
80 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
81 Id. at 584–607 (White, J., for the Court); id. at 607–12 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 
612–15 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 615–34 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 635–45 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. at 608 (Powell, J., concurring). Indicating just how convoluted the opinions in 
Guardians were, one commentator attempted to clarify the decision in the following man-
ner: 
[T]wo justices in two opinions agreed that Title VI prohibited intentional and 
unintentional discrimination and seven justices in three opinions agreed that 
Title VI prohibited only intentional discrimination, but ªve justices in three 
opinions agreed that Title VI regulations could prohibit unintentional dis-
crimination. Two justices in two opinions agreed that Title VI regulations 
could prohibit unintentional discrimination because Title VI prohibited un-
intentional discrimination, and three justices in one opinion agreed that Title 
VI regulations could prohibit unintentional discrimination even though Title 
VI itself prohibited only intentional discrimination. 
Michael D. Mattheisen, The Effect of Alexander v. Sandoval on Federal Environmental Civil 
Rights (Environmental Justice) Policy, 13 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 35, 63 (2003) (foot-
notes omitted). 
83 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592–93 (White, J., for the Court); id. at 623 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Brennan, JJ.); see 
also Mank, supra note 48, at 33; Mattheisen, supra note 82, at 63; Smith, supra note 14, at 
239. 
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not the holding of the Court, it has sustained little support in subse-
quent judicial decisions.84
 In contrast to the Guardians decision, Alexander v. Choate consisted 
of one unanimous opinion.85 The Choate Court declared that Guardians 
stood for two principles. First, “Title VI itself directly reached only in-
stances of intentional discrimination.”86 Second, the Court stated that 
Guardians also held that “actions having an unjustiªable disparate im-
pact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations de-
signed to implement the purposes of Title VI.”87 Choate, particularly its 
reading of Guardians, would appear to be a unanimous endorsement of 
agencies’ ability to promulgate disparate-impact regulations, despite 
criticism that this reading of Guardians relies on statements made in 
dicta.88 In any event, these cases set the groundwork for the next envi-
ronmental justice task: determining whether disparate-impact regula-
tions were privately enforceable. 
B. The Rise and Fall of the Implied Right of Action 
 In determining whether an implied right of action exists to en-
force a statute, the Supreme Court has employed a four-factor test 
adopted from the 1975 case Cort v. Ash.89 First, the statute must have 
been enacted to beneªt a class of which the plaintiff is a member; 
second, there must be implicit or explicit evidence that Congress in-
tended to create the remedy; third, the judicial remedy must be con-
sistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme; and 
fourth, the federal right of action must not infringe on important 
state concerns.90 The Cort analysis has also been used to imply private 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281–82 (2001). 
85 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
86 Id. at 293. 
87 Id. 
88 Mattheisen, supra note 82, at 64–66 (arguing that because Choate involved section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Guardians was a case concerning Title VI, the 
analogy between the two statutes was made in dicta). 
89 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
90 Id. 
 In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of 
the class for whose especial beneªt the statute was enacted—that is, does the 
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any in-
dication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a rem-
edy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And ªnally, is the 
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the 
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rights of action to enforce rules and regulations promulgated by ad-
ministrative agencies.91 Should a rule or regulation pass the Cort fac-
tors, an implied right of action will be found if “the agency rule is 
properly within the scope of the enabling statute, and . . . implying a 
private right of action will further the purpose of the enabling stat-
ute.”92 Using this analysis and the Supreme Court’s Title VI decisions, 
courts in recent years have been asked to ªnd an implied private right 
of action under Title VI that would allow plaintiffs to enforce dispa-
rate-impact regulations.93
1. Chester Residents: Implying a Private Right of Action 
 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living brought suit 
against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
(PADEP), alleging that the department’s issuance of a permit to a soil 
remediation facility in the city of Chester violated, among other things, 
EPA’s disparate-impact regulations.94 The city of Chester, located in 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania, had a population of 42,000 people, 
sixty-ªve percent of whom were African American.95 The remainder of 
the county had a population of 502,000, over ninety percent of whom 
were Caucasian, and only 6.2% of whom were African American.96 Ac-
cording to plaintiffs, PADEP had granted ªve waste facility permits for 
sites in Chester, while only granting two permits for sites in the rest of 
the County.97 Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that the city of Chester had 
a permit capacity of 2.1 million tons of waste per year, as compared to 
the 1400 tons per year at non-Chester facilities.98 In ruling in favor of 
Chester Residents, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined 
to ªnd an implied private right of action embedded in either Supreme 
Court precedent or its own precedent, despite the plaintiffs’ conten-
                                                                                                                      
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of ac-
tion based solely on federal law? 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
91 See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397–98 (3d Cir. 1999); Chester Residents Con-
cerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 933 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 
974 (1998); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985). 
92 Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 947. 
93 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001); Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927; 
South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 473–74 (D.N.J. 2001). 
94 Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927. 
95 Id. at n.1. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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tion that one existed.99 Instead, it conducted its own analysis to ªnd 
that an implied cause of action did indeed exist to enforce EPA’s dispa-
rate-impact regulations.100 The court reasoned that: (1) EPA’s dispa-
rate-impact regulations were within the scope of Title VI; (2) the Su-
preme Court factors from Cort v. Ash properly permitted implication of 
a private right of action; and (3) implying a private right of action fur-
thered the purpose of Title VI.101
 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court never had the chance to address 
the issue.102 While on certiorari to the Court, Pennsylvania withdrew the 
challenged permits,103 leading the Court to dismiss the case as moot 
and vacate the Third Circuit’s decision.104 Though the Chester Residents 
decision was vacated and dismissed, it remains a signiªcant case for en-
vironmental justice, as it was the ªrst time any circuit addressed the issue 
of implied private rights of action to enforce EPA’s disparate-impact 
regulations.105 Furthermore, its analysis has been revived in subsequent 
decisions in the Third Circuit, such as Powell v. Ridge, where the court 
reiterated its conclusion in Chester Residents that an implied right of ac-
tion exists under EPA’s disparate-impact regulations.106
2. South Camden I : Continued Support for an Implied Right of Action 
 Three years after the decision in Chester Residents, the question of 
whether an implied right of action could be found to enforce EPA’s 
disparate-impact regulations was to be litigated once again.107 Plain-
tiffs in South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t of Environmental 
Protection (South Camden I ) alleged that in granting a Clean Air Act 
permit to the St. Lawrence Cement Company (SLC) to operate a pol-
lutant-emitting plant in the Waterfront South neighborhood of Cam-
den, New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (NJDEP) violated EPA’s disparate-impact regulations.108 At the 
time suit was ªled, ninety-one percent of Waterfront South’s residents 
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. at 931–33. 
100 Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 933–36. 
101 Id. at 933–36. 
102 Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 974 (1998) (vacat-
ing the judgment as moot and remanding to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for 
dismissal). 
103 See Core, supra note 8, at 206. 
104 Seif, 524 U.S. at 974. 
105 Core, supra note 8, at 206. 
106 See 189 F.3d 387, 397–400 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Core, supra note 8, at 206. 
107 South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001). 
108 Id. at 451. 
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belonged to racial minorities.109 Not only was Waterfront South a mi-
nority community, it was also a low-income community: more than 
half the residents lived at or below the federal poverty level.110 Addi-
tionally, the neighborhood—which covered an area of less than one 
square mile111—was already home to three county-run industrial sites, 
including a sewage plant and a trash-to-steam plant, two Superfund 
sites, four sites under investigation for the release of hazardous sub-
stances, and ªfteen other sites identiªed by the NJDEP as contami-
nated.112 Despite these pre-existing hazards and the demonstrably 
poor health of Waterfront South’s residents,113 SLC was granted a 
permit that would have allowed its plant to emit particulate matter, 
mercury, lead, manganese, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, sulfur 
oxide, volatile organic compounds, and radioactive material.114
 The court, in ªnding a violation of EPA’s Title VI regulations, is-
sued a preliminary injunction vacating the permit granted to SLC, de-
spite the fact that the facility was otherwise in compliance with EPA’s 
emissions limitations.115 This holding was predicated on two ªndings: 
(1) in addition to compliance with environmental standards, NJDEP 
had an obligation under Title VI to consider the racially discriminatory 
disparate impacts of issuing a permit to SLC;116 and (2) plaintiffs had 
established a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination based 
on race.117 The court’s decision relied heavily on precedents such as 
Chester Residents and Powell in declaring that an implied private right of 
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. Of Waterfront South’s 2132 residents, 63% were African American, 28% were 
Hispanic, and 9% were Caucasian. Camden County, in which Waterfront South was lo-
cated, was over 75% Caucasian. Id. at 451, 459. 
110 Id. at 459. The median income in Waterfront South was $15,082, a mere 38% of the 
county’s overall median income of $40,027. Id. 
111 Steve Strunsky, Air Is Heavy with Pollution, and Resentment, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2001, 
at B5. 
112 South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
113 Included in the court’s ªndings of fact is a detailed account of the alarmingly poor 
health of the residents of Waterfront South. Id. at 460–68. Uncontested expert testimony 
showed that African American residents of Camden County suffered a higher cancer rate 
than the rest of the state. Id. at 461. Additionally, residents of Waterfront South reported 
an asthma rate twice that of the rate reported by residents in the rest of the city of Cam-
den. Id. 
114 Id. at 454, 469. 
115 Id. at 468–69, 496, 505. 
116 Id. at 474. 
117 Id. at 493. The court further found that NJDEP had failed to meet its rebuttal bur-
den of showing that it had a substantial legitimate justiªcation or a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for its practice. Id. at 495–97. 
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action existed to enforce EPA’s disparate-impact regulations.118 Though 
short-lived, the South Camden I decision, particularly its declaration that 
there exists a privately enforceable right to compel permitting agencies 
to consider the disparate impacts of their actions, was a tremendous 
victory for environmental justice advocates. 
3. Alexander v. Sandoval : A Turning of the Tides for Implied Rights of 
Action 
 Just ªve days after the South Camden I ruling, the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, ªnding that no im-
plied private right of action exists to enforce disparate-impact regula-
tions promulgated under section 602 of Title VI.119 Though not an 
environmental justice case, the Court’s decision in Sandoval had 
sweeping consequences for private enforcement of all Title VI dispa-
rate-impact regulations.120
 Martha Sandoval challenged the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety’s decision to administer the state driver’s license test only in 
English, alleging that such a policy had the effect of discriminating 
based on national origin in violation of Title VI.121 The Court ad-
dressed only the issue of whether a private cause of action can be 
found to enforce section 602 disparate-impact regulations.122 In the 5 
to 4 decision, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged 
that “private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and ob-
                                                                                                                      
118 See South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 473–74. This decision was not reached in a 
vacuum, however. The court took special notice of a pending Supreme Court case, which it 
acknowledged could overturn its ruling should the Supreme Court decide the issue differ-
ently. Id. Absent a decision from the Supreme Court, however, the South Camden I court 
was bound by Third Circuit precedent and ruled accordingly, despite SLC’s insistence that 
the Supreme Court would soon ªnd that Title VI disparate-impact regulations do not give 
rise to implied rights of action. Id. at 474. 
119 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
120 La Londe, supra note 62, at 27 (“On April 24, 2001, the Supreme Court dealt a ma-
jor blow to the environmental justice movement. Its decision in Alexander v. Sandoval 
changed the landscape of the environmental justice movement, overturning thirty years of 
precedent and forcing environmental justice advocates to search for new mechanisms to 
pursue their goals.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Core, supra note 8 (explaining the 
environmental justice consequences of Sandoval). 
121 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278–79. Alabama’s Department of Public Safety received fed-
eral funding from the United States Department of Justice and Department of Transporta-
tion, thereby subjecting itself to the provisions of Title VI. Id. at 278. 
122 Id. at 279. 
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tain both injunctive relief and damages.”123 However, the Court stated 
that section 601 prohibited only intentional discrimination, not dispa-
rate impacts.124 Quoting Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the 
Court noted that “§ 601 proscribe[s] only those racial classiªcations 
that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amend-
ment.”125 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the right to enforce dispa-
rate-impact regulations could not come from section 601, since such 
regulations prohibit conduct that is permitted under section 601.126 
Instead, if a private right of action were to be found, it would need to 
be found in section 602 itself.127
 Turning its attention to an analysis of section 602, the Court 
found that, unlike section 601, section 602 lacked any “rights-creating 
language” indicative of a congressional intent to create a private right 
of action.128 Additionally, the Court determined that the language of 
section 602 did not appear to provide any congressionally intended 
private remedies.129 Absent any indication that Congress intended to 
create a private right of action or remedy under section 602, regula-
tions promulgated under that section cannot create them, and there-
fore, the Court determined that no private right of action existed to 
enforce disparate-impact regulations.130
 The Court further implicitly criticized the application of the Cort 
factors to regulations, declaring that agency regulations can merely 
invoke a private right of action that Congress has created in the text 
of the enabling statute, but they may not create a right where Con-
gress has not, irrespective of the outcome of a Cort analysis.131 To use 
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979), which, in ªnding a private 
right of action under Title IX, analogized the statute to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
124 Id. at 280–81. 
125 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also re-
lied on Guardians and Alexander v. Choate as afªrmation of this principle. 
126 Id. at 285. 
127 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. The right to enforce disparate-impact regulations, in Jus-
tice Scalia’s own words, “must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia’s language throughout the opinion hinted that perhaps 
administrative agencies lacked the authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations 
under section 602, but as this issue was not raised by the parties, it was not discussed by the 
Court. See infra text accompanying notes 135–38. 
128 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89. 
129 Id. at 289–90. 
130 Id. at 291, 293. 
131 See id. at 291. 
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Justice Scalia’s analogy, “[a]gencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice 
but not the sorcerer himself.”132
 In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that, despite the Court’s 
decision, plaintiffs seeking to enforce disparate-impact regulations, “in 
all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief.”133 There is 
some question as to the validity of this statement, however, as some 
commentators have suggested that perhaps Sandoval eliminated the 
ability of plaintiffs to enforce disparate-impact regulations through 
§ 1983 as well.134
 What is most striking about the Sandoval decision is Justice 
Scalia’s thinly veiled suggestion that agencies may lack the authority 
to promulgate disparate-impact regulations under section 602 of Title 
VI altogether.135 Even though the Court assumed, without deciding, 
that such regulations were in fact valid federal law, the majority dis-
played some concerns with this assumption.136 Wrote Justice Scalia: 
[W]e must assume for purposes of deciding this case that 
regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly 
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial 
groups, even though such activities are permissible under 
§ 601. Though no opinion of this Court has held that, ªve 
Justices in Guardians voiced that view of the law . . . . These 
statements are in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke 
and Guardians that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimina-
tion, but petitioners have not challenged the regulations 
here. We therefore assume for the purposes of deciding this 
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 300. Enforcing disparate-impact regulations through § 1983 was an idea that 
Justice Stevens had suggested in previous opinions. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 638 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677, 696–97 n.21 (1979); see also Core, supra note 8, at 218–19. Section 1983 states: 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
134 See Core, supra note 8, at 224–36. 
135 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281–82; see also John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. 
Sandoval and Its Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1627–31 
(2002). 
136 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281–82. 
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case that [Title VI] regulations proscribing activities that 
have a disparate impact on the basis of race are valid.137
Language throughout the opinion suggested that Justice Scalia did 
not believe this assumption was well grounded.138
 The implications of this decision are extensive, affecting every-
thing from the environmental justice movement139 to broader civil 
rights concerns.140 Given the importance of judicial enforcement of 
environmental justice, the loss of a private right of action to enforce 
EPA’s disparate-impact regulations was a crushing blow.141 Therefore, 
environmental justice plaintiffs, no longer able to directly enforce 
disparate-impact regulations, took Justice Stevens’s suggestion, and 
focused their efforts on § 1983 actions as a means of private enforce-
ment.142 While this strategy enjoyed some initial success, it too was 
short-lived.143
4. South Camden II and III : Further Restricting Enforcement of 
Disparate-Impact Regulations 
 Following the Court’s decision in Sandoval, which implicitly over-
ruled the district court’s ªnding in South Camden I, the parties to the 
South Camden I  litigation, were asked by District Judge Stephen Orlof-
                                                                                                                      
137 Id. (citations omitted). Absent a challenge to this assumption, the Court was unable 
to address its validity. One commentator has argued that, while perhaps an “unofªcial 
holding” of the case, the Court in Sandoval implicitly invalidated disparate-impact regula-
tions on the ground that such regulations exceeded agencies’ authority under the ena-
bling statute—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Laufer, supra note 135, at 1627–
35. 
138 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285 (“It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations 
do not simply apply § 601—since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits—and 
therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private 
right to enforce these regulations.”); id. at 286 (“[The right to enforce Title VI regula-
tions] must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602.”). 
139 See generally Core, supra note 8. 
140 See Linda Greenhouse, In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work, 
N.Y. Times, July 2, 2001, at A12 (noting that the Sandoval decision “substantially limited the 
effectiveness of one of the most important civil rights laws, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964”). 
141 See Core, supra note 8, at 239–42. Core argues that in denying an implied private 
right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations, the Sandoval decision essentially 
eliminated the possibility of using § 1983 to enforce the regulations as well. Id. In other 
words, the Court’s decision “clos[ed] the courtroom door to Title VI disparate impact 
plaintiffs.” Id. at 224. 
142 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 
(D.N.J. 2001) [South Camden II]. 
143 South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 790–91 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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sky to submit briefs regarding the effect of the Sandoval ruling on the 
South Camden I decision.144 Speciªcally, the parties were asked to ad-
dress whether Title VI disparate-impact regulations may still be en-
forced through § 1983, thereby entitling plaintiffs to injunctive re-
lief.145 Having concluded that the Sandoval decision had not 
precluded plaintiffs from asserting a § 1983 claim,146 the District 
Court analyzed whether Title VI regulations created a federal right 
under which plaintiffs could assert a § 1983 violation.147 The court 
used the standards established by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. 
Freestone148 to determine whether disparate-impact regulations created 
federal rights.149 First, the court, relying on the Supreme Court deci-
sion Wright v. City of Roanoke, determined that agencies were capable 
of creating rights through their rulemaking authority, which had the 
“force and effect of law.”150 Then, applying the Blessing standard, the 
court concluded that EPA’s Title VI regulations created a right to be 
                                                                                                                      
144 South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 509. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 518. The court, expressly heeding Justice Scalia’s admonition that courts are 
“bound by holdings, not language,” id. at 513, carefully parsed the Sandoval decision and 
concluded that the Supreme Court had not speciªcally addressed the § 1983 question. Id. 
at 513–18. 
147 Id. at 518–19. 
148 520 U.S. 329 (1997). The Blessing standard, as quoted by the court in South Camden 
II, requires: 
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question beneªt the 
plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly pro-
tected by the statute is not so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement 
would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously im-
pose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving 
rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than preca-
tory, terms. 
Id. at 340–41. 
149 The South Camden II court distinguished its analysis from the analyses courts gener-
ally have applied when determining the presence of an implied right of action. An implied 
right of action analysis, the court noted, is conducted using the four Cort factors, including 
the presence of a congressionally intended remedy, so as to alleviate any concern that 
courts, rather than Congress, might be creating remedies for violations of statutes. When 
determining whether a right exists sufªcient for a § 1983 claim, however, courts are less 
concerned with the existence of a congressionally intended remedy, since a private cause 
of action is already provided for in § 1983. Therefore, given this distinction, a court could 
ªnd that a statute that does not create an implied right of action nonetheless contains 
rights that are enforceable under § 1983. South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 520–24. 
150 Id. at 526–29 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) and Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)). 
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free from disparate impacts of environmental regulation, and that this 
right could be enforced through § 1983.151
 While this victory might have temporarily revitalized the envi-
ronmental justice movement, it did not last.152 On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ªnding that Sandoval had 
implicitly foreclosed a § 1983 claim to enforce EPA’s disparate-impact 
regulations.153
 The Third Circuit’s reversal in South Camden III criticized the dis-
trict court’s reading and reliance on Wright v. City of Roanoke.154 Accord-
ing to the court of appeals, Wright concerned a regulation that deªned 
a right already provided by Congress in the authorizing statute.155 The 
same could not be said for section 602 regulations, the court reasoned, 
since, as Sandoval had explicitly stated, Title VI protections extend to 
intentional discrimination only; the statute, therefore, does not provide 
a right against disparate-impact discrimination.156
 Given this distinction, the court determined that the district 
court’s application of the Blessing standard was erroneous.157 The 
question of whether a regulation creates a right enforceable under 
§ 1983, the court reasoned, turns on whether that right was created by 
the statute authorizing the regulation, not any independent analysis 
of the regulation itself.158 Therefore, to the extent that Sandoval 
found Title VI to proscribe only intentional discrimination, disparate-
impact regulations could not be privately enforced under § 1983.159 
The court thus reversed the district court’s decision.160 A few months 
later, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.161
 The South Camden III decision conªrmed what many had sus-
pected: Alexander v. Sandoval not only eliminated an implied private 
right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations, it also fore-
closed the possibility of using § 1983 as an enforcement mecha-
                                                                                                                      
151 Id. at 542, 549. 
152 See generally South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). 
153 See id. at 774. 
154 Id. at 782–83. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 788–89 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–90 (2001)). 
157 See id. at 782–83. 
158 See South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 783, 790. “[I]f there is to be a private enforceable 
right under Title VI to be free from disparate impact discrimination, Congress, and not an 
administrative agency or a court, must create this right.” Id. at 790. 
159 Id. at 790–91. 
160 Id. at 791. 
161 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 536 U.S. 939 (2002). 
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nism.162 Following the Third Circuit’s decision and others like it,163 
the momentum gained by the environmental justice movement fol-
lowing victories in Chester Residents and South Camden I and II quickly 
vanished. 
II. The Viability of Disparate-Impact Suits After Sandoval 
 In light of the Supreme Court’s ªnding that no private right of 
action exists to enforce Title VI disparate-impact regulations, along 
with the Third Circuit’s ªnding that these regulations are not en-
forceable under § 1983, as well as the Sandoval majority’s suggestion 
that agencies may lack the authority to pass such regulations alto-
gether, the environmental justice movement has encountered a con-
siderable roadblock.164 While environmental justice has stalled in the 
wake of Sandoval and South Camden III, commentators may have sig-
naled its death a bit prematurely. Disparate-impact regulations, if 
proven to still be valid exercises of administrative discretion under 
Title VI,165 and despite Sandoval’s assertions to the contrary,166 can 
still be enforced by private parties in certain, albeit narrow, circum-
stances. 
A. EPA’s Title VI Disparate-Impact Regulations Remain Valid Federal Law 
 Contrary to the Sandoval Court’s assertion, Bakke did not hold that 
there was clear congressional intent to limit the scope of Title VI to in-
tentional discrimination—rather, the Bakke Court’s Title VI analysis was, 
as the Bakke Court acknowledged, discussed in dicta.167 As Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                                      
162 See, e.g., Core, supra note 8, at 242. 
163 See id. at 236 (noting that all the federal Courts of Appeals except one—the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit—have found that purely regulatory rights cannot be en-
forced through § 1983). 
164 See, e.g., Schoªeld, supra note 14, at 925–26 (concluding that short of an intentional 
discrimination suit, environmental justice plaintiffs are left to rely purely on administrative 
enforcement of Title VI regulations); Core, supra note 8, at 242 (noting that administrative 
enforcement is unlikely to ªll the void left by the courts’ elimination of private actions 
under Title VI, and therefore concluding that activism and public awareness may be the 
best option); Smith, supra note 14, at 256 (concluding that the environmental justice 
plaintiff’s only viable option post-Sandoval is administrative enforcement). 
165 See Galalis, supra note 7, at 86–100 (arguing that Bakke does not indicate congres-
sional intent to limit Title VI to a prohibition of intentional discrimination, as suggested by 
Sandoval, but that rather, EPA’s disparate-impact regulations are valid exercises of adminis-
trative discretion according to the familiar Chevron test); see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
166 See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
167 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (“In this Court 
the parties neither briefed not argued applicability of Title VI . . . . Rather . . . they focused 
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noted in his majority opinion in Sandoval, courts are “bound by hold-
ings, not language.”168 Therefore, since the Bakke Court’s Title VI dis-
cussion is dicta, it is neither the holding of the Court, nor binding 
upon other courts.169 Additionally, the plain language of Title VI indi-
cates that Congress expressed no clear or unambiguous intent to limit 
the scope of “discrimination” to intentional discrimination.170 The leg-
islative history of Title VI indicates that, due to disagreement among 
members of Congress as to the deªnition and scope of the term “dis-
crimination,” Congress deliberately left the question unresolved, opting 
instead to defer the issue to agency discretion.171
  In the absence of clear congressional intent to limit the scope of 
Title VI, the validity of agencies’ disparate-impact regulations must be 
evaluated under the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron, 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.172 Under the Chevron 
analysis, a court must defer to a permissible agency interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute.173 Therefore, given the lack of clear congressional 
                                                                                                                      
exclusively upon the validity of the special admissions program under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”); Galalis, supra note 7, at 90–91. The Court engaged in the Title VI analysis be-
cause the canons of judicial decisionmaking require that courts avoid constitutional inter-
pretation where decisions can be based on statutory interpretation. The discussion was 
unnecessary, however, both to the question before the Court and to the Court’s ultimate 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of all racial classiªcations 
regardless of motive. Subsequent commentators, including the Sandoval Court, have not 
given sufªcient weight to this fact. See Galalis, supra note 7, at 90–91. 
168 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001). 
169 See Galalis, supra note 7, at 89–91. 
170 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, §§ 601–602, 78 Stat. 252 (codiªed 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2000)); Galalis, supra note 7, at 93–94. 
171 Galalis, supra note 7, at 95–97. Galalis further concludes that neither the underlying 
purpose of Title VI, nor subsequent legislative action, is any more helpful in identifying a 
clear, unambiguous congressional intent to limit the scope of Title VI to intentional dis-
crimination. Id. at 97–100. Quite the contrary, subsequent legislative action may indeed 
indicate congressional ratiªcation of Title VI disparate-impact regulations. Id. at 99–100. 
172 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
173 Id. at 842–43. Chevron, which stands for the principle of judicial deference to agen-
cies’ reasonable interpretations of statutory ambiguities, articulated a two-step analysis. 
First, a court must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue.” Id. at 842. If so, and the intent of Congress is clear, the analysis is ªnished 
and the agency must defer to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 842–
43. If not, however, the court may not simply impose its own construction of the statute; 
rather, it must engage in the second step of the analysis, which requires a determination of 
whether the agency has permissibly construed the statute. Id. at 843. If the agency’s con-
struction is a permissible one—that is, if it is reasonable—the court must defer to it, even if 
the court believes it is not the only, or even best, construction the agency could have 
adopted. See id. at 843–44 & n.11. Should a regulation pass the ªrst step of the Chevron 
analysis, it is nearly universally accepted that the agency will prevail on the second. Ste-
phen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 290 (5th ed. 
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intent to restrict Title VI to intentional discrimination,174 and the fact 
that disparate-impact regulations are a permissible—that is, reason-
able175—construction of Title VI,176 EPA’s disparate-impact regulations 
are valid federal law post-Sandoval.177
B. Section 110 of the CAA Allows for Enforcement of EPA’s Title VI  
Disparate-Impact Regulations 
 The fact that EPA’s disparate-impact regulations continue to con-
stitute valid federal law is signiªcant in that it allows enforcement of 
the regulations despite the loss of a private right of action. Necessary 
to such enforcement is the type of statutory handle found in section 
110 of the Clean Air Act (CAA),178 which governs submission and ap-
proval of state implementation plans (SIPs).179
 As a means of achieving the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards (NAAQS) promulgated under the CAA, Congress established a 
“cooperative federalism” scheme of regulation.180 Paramount to this 
scheme are the state implementation plans—indeed, SIPs are the 
principal component of EPA’s pollution control efforts.181 They must 
be created by each state and must outline the speciªc means by which 
that state will achieve the NAAQS. By statutory command, each SIP 
must provide, among other things: (1) enforceable emission limita-
tions for individual sources and a timetable for compliance of those 
                                                                                                                      
2002) (noting that no Supreme Court decision has ever invalidated an agency decision 
under step two of the analysis). 
174 See Galalis, supra note 7, at 92–100 (arguing that the 88th Congress, at the very 
least, did not speak to whether Title VI concerned intentional or disparate-impact dis-
crimination—that is, its intent was ambiguous—and at the most, explicitly intended Title 
VI to embrace both an intent and effects standard). 
175 See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1996); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 
355 F.3d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 2003). 
176 See Note, supra note 56, at 1783–85. 
177 See Galalis, supra note 7, at 101. 
178 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
179 42. U.S.C. § 7410 (2000). Section 7410(a)(1) reads in pertinent part: 
 Each State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator . . . a plan 
which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [any 
promulgated] primary standard . . . . In addition, such State shall adopt and 
submit to the Administrator . . . a plan which provides for implementation, 
maintenance, and enforcement of [any promulgated] secondary stan-
dard . . . . 
Id. § 7410(a)(1). 
180 See Mark S. Squillace & David R. Wooley, Air Pollution 93 (3d ed. 1999). 
181 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law § 3.6, at 197 (2d ed. 1994). 
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sources; (2) procedures to review new sources; (3) procedures to 
monitor and analyze air quality; (4) assurances that the state has ade-
quate personnel and funding to execute the implementation plan; 
and (5) assurances that the SIP will not operate in violation of any 
federal law.182 Once submitted and approved by EPA, a SIP becomes a 
federal regulation with the force and effect of law,183 and is binding 
upon the submitting state.184
 Of particular interest to environmental justice plaintiffs is the 
requirement that SIPs provide assurances of their compliance with 
federal law.185 Embodied in section 110(a)(2)(E) of the CAA, the pro-
vision states that “[e]ach [state implementation] plan shall . . . pro-
vide . . . necessary assurances that the State . . . is not prohibited by 
any provision of Federal or State law from carrying out such imple-
mentation plan or portion thereof.”186 To the extent that EPA’s dispa-
rate-impact regulations constitute a “provision of Federal . . . law,” sec-
tion 110(a)(2)(E) provides EPA with the authority—indeed, the 
nondiscretionary duty—to ensure that a submitted SIP will not result 
in environmental discrimination in violation of these regulations.187
 Speciªcally, this “statutory handle” works as follows: section 
110(a)(2)(E) of the Clean Air Act mandates that a state provide neces-
sary assurances that its implementation plan will not operate in viola-
                                                                                                                      
182 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)–(2). Included among “federal law” is, of course, EPA’s dis-
parate-impact regulations. See Galalis, supra note 7, at 100–01; discussion supra Part II.A. 
183 George Hays & Nadia Wetzler, Federal Recognition of Variances: A Window into the Tur-
bulent Relationship Between Science and Law Under the Clean Air Act, 13 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 
115, 119 (1998). 
184 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2); see, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. Kean, 871 F.2d 319, 322 (3d Cir. 
1989) (“SIPs are not merely advisory; once EPA approves a SIP the state is obligated to 
comply with it.); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[A SIP], 
once adopted by a state and approved by the EPA, becomes controlling and must be car-
ried out by the state. . . . [F]ull compliance with the plan is mandated.”). 
185 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E). 
186 Id.; see also Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Assis-
tance from the Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a)(1) (2004). Section 
7.80(a)(1) states: “Applicants for EPA assistance shall submit an assurance with their appli-
cations stating that, with respect to their programs or activities that receive EPA assistance, 
they will comply with the requirements of this Part.” Included in Part 7 is § 7.35(b), EPA’s 
disparate-impact regulations. 
187 The possibility of using section 110(a)(2)(E) to address disparate environmental 
harms was ªrst raised in the literature by Professor Richard Lazarus and Stephanie Tai, 
though the practicality of this approach has yet to be explored. See Richard J. Lazarus & 
Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 Ecology 
L.Q. 617, 633; see also Hays & Wetzler, supra note 183, at 126–27; Galalis, supra note 7, at 77 
n.132. 
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tion of any federal law.188 Since EPA’s Title VI disparate-impact regula-
tions constitute a provision of federal law,189 a state is therefore re-
quired under the CAA to provide necessary assurances that its plan will 
not operate in violation of these disparate-impact regulations. While 
EPA has never explicitly stated what the “necessary assurances” clause 
requires of states, courts have determined that, at a minimum, this 
clause imposes an afªrmative duty on states to provide a detailed dem-
onstration upon which EPA can base a reasoned judgment as to the 
state’s compliance or noncompliance with the statute.190 The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has stated that an “assurance” is an “act . . . 
that inspires or tends to inspire conªdence,”191 dispelling any notion 
that the “shall” language of the clause might not place an afªrmative 
duty on states. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has found 
that, once fulªlled, a state’s duty to provide necessary assurances re-
quires the Administrator to then make a “reasoned judgment” on the 
matter and provide a “detailed statement of his rationale.”192
 The nexus of the courts’ decisions makes clear that a state cannot 
sit idly by and hope to satisfy the necessary assurances required by sec-
tion 110(a)(2)(E) of the CAA, nor can EPA fully approve a plan that 
fails to provide such assurances or provides inadequate assurances.193 
In the Title VI context, states must demonstrate how their plans will 
operate in conformity with EPA’s disparate-impact regulations. The 
precise breadth of this requirement is unclear, but it is not unreason-
able to expect states to provide scientiªc and demographic support for 
their assurances just as they would when demonstrating compliance 
with any other provision of the CAA. Such support might include emis-
sions documentation, projected health and safety consequences, census 
                                                                                                                      
188 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E). 
189 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
190 See Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 
478 F.2d 875, 884 (1st Cir. 1973); see Rodgers, supra note 181, § 3.6, at 197. 
191 NRDC, 478 F.2d at 883 (emphasis added). 
192 Friends of the Earth, 499 F.2d at 1126 (ªnding that “[necessary assurances] call[] for 
the Administrator’s reasoned judgment . . . and direct[]the Administrator to provide a detailed 
statement of his rationale”) (emphasis added); see also NRDC, 478 F.2d at 884 (“The ‘neces-
sary assurances’ clause seems to us to call less for rhetoric than for the Administrator’s 
reasoned judgment . . . .”). 
193 See Friends of the Earth, 499 F.2d at 1126; NRDC, 478 F.2d at 883–84; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(k)(3) (granting Administrator authority for full and partial approval and disap-
proval of SIPs). But cf. The Clean Air Act Handbook 36 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & 
David P. Novello eds., 1997) (noting that, in recognition of the fact that SIPs often start 
out generally and are later modiªed, EPA has determined that SIPs may be deemed “com-
plete” if they are in at least 80% regulatory form). 
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data, and an analysis of where existing facilities lie in relation to minor-
ity populations. The totality of data would have to demonstrate an 
equal distribution of adverse environmental affects. Once a state has 
made such a demonstration, EPA must make a reasoned judgment, 
based on the facts provided by the state, as to whether the SIP will op-
erate in conformity with the agency’s disparate-impact regulations.194 
No such judgment can be made where there is an utter lack of assur-
ances by the state, where the assurances provided are inadequate, or 
where there is any indication that a SIP might operate in violation of 
the disparate-impact regulations. In such a case, EPA would have no 
facts upon which to base a judgment, and therefore any judgment of-
fered by EPA could not be considered “reasoned.” 
 If advocates could ªnd a way to privately enforce 110(a)(2)(E), 
this provision could potentially resurrect the environmental justice 
movement.195 The practical issues involved in challenging EPA ap-
proval of a SIP that violates section 110(a)(2)(E) are discussed in the 
following section. 
III. Enforcing Disparate-Impact Regulations Through the CAA 
 Exactly what section 110(a)(2)(E) means for states submitting 
SIPs and EPA’s SIP approval process is unclear, as the issue has yet to 
be litigated.196 Whether a plaintiff in such a suit would prevail is any-
thing but certain. However, given the theoretical support for this type 
of challenge and the strong policy arguments advocating citizen in-
volvement, there is reason to believe that at the very least, a citizen 
suit would help invigorate the environmental justice movement, per-
haps even if the suit itself were unsuccessful. 
 What is certain is that a plaintiff challenging EPA approval of a 
SIP on the grounds that it violates section 110(a)(2)(E) can expect to 
encounter many obstacles familiar to environmental justice advocates, 
including the burden of having to establish both a statutory right to 
                                                                                                                      
194 See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). 
(“[An] agency must articulate a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962))). 
195 See Lazarus & Tai, supra note 187, at 633; see also Hays & Wetzler, supra note 183, at 
126–27; Galalis, supra note 7, at 77 n.132. 
196 A Westlaw search on this question returns a single case: Sweat v. Hull, 200 F. Supp. 2d 
1162 (D. Ariz. 2001). While the case quotes the language of section 110(a)(2)(E), it does not 
discuss the “federal law” provision’s effect on the SIP approval process. See Sweat, 200 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1168–69. 
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sue and constitutional standing to sue. Should these threshold obsta-
cles be overcome, a plaintiff next would be faced with the Herculean 
task of prevailing on the merits, despite narrow standards of review 
and heavy burdens of proof. 
A. Establishing a Statutory Right to Sue 
 Any attempt to privately enforce the CAA begins with the Act’s 
citizen suit provisions found in section 304.197 Recognizing that EPA 
may not be able to effectively monitor and prosecute every violation 
of the CAA, Congress enacted section 304 with the intention that citi-
zen involvement would complement the administrative process.198
 Section 304 was intended to serve at least two distinct purposes: 
(1) strengthen enforcement of the CAA through citizen participation; 
and (2) motivate government agencies to be more vigilant in enforc-
ing the Act’s provisions.199 To these ends, section 304 permits “any 
person” to commence legal action against anyone “alleged to have 
violated . . . an emission standard or limitation,”200 as well as against 
the EPA Administrator for failure to perform any nondiscretionary 
act or duty.201
 The courts have recognized Congress’s intent in enacting this 
provision.202 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted: 
Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be 
treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as wel-
                                                                                                                      
197 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). 
198 See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976); Gauna, supra 
note 1, at 40; Roger A. Greenbaum & Anne S. Peterson, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990: Citizen Suits and How They Work, 2 Fordham Envtl. L. Rep. 79, 79 (1991). 
199 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 36–37 (1970). 
200 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). While section 304(a)(1) may be the more commonly util-
ized citizen suit provision of the CAA, it is probably of little help to the plaintiff seeking to 
challenge a SIP alleged to be in violation of EPA’s disparate-impact regulations. Although 
“emission standard or limitation” is broadly deªned in section 304(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f), 
and has been further broadened by the courts, it still is generally limited to “a state 
threshold or limit on emissions that is . . . aimed at attaining or maintaining air quality 
standards.” Greenbaum & Peterson, supra note 198, at 87. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
enforcement of a SIP’s assurance of compliance with disparate-impact regulations would 
be encompassed by this deªnition. 
201 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf—against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administra-
tor . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
202 See, e.g., Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979); Carey, 
535 F.2d at 172–74; NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699–701 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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comed participants in the vindication of environmental in-
terests. Fearing that administrative enforcement might falter 
or stall, “the citizen suits provision reºected a deliberate 
choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts, as a 
supplemental and effective assurance that the [Clean Air] 
Act would be implemented and enforced.”203
While courts generally have embraced the jurisdiction granted to citi-
zens by Congress, they also have been careful to note that “Congress 
did not ºing the courts’ door wide open,” but rather, limited access to 
“clear-cut violations by polluters or defaults by the Administrator.”204
 Section 304 remains the most direct route to the courts for private 
plaintiffs seeking to enforce CAA provisions, though it certainly is not 
the only one.205 Section 307(b)(1) provides that a “petition for review” 
of any “ªnal action” by the Administrator, including approval of im-
plementation plans, may be ªled in the United States court of appeals 
for the appropriate circuit within sixty days of the action or approval in 
question.206 Additionally, under the judicial review provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),207 an individual may challenge 
SIP approval once administrative remedies have been exhausted.208
 Therefore, a plaintiff challenging approval of a SIP for failure to 
provide necessary assurances of compliance with EPA’s disparate-
impact regulations has three means of establishing a right to sue:209 
(1) bringing action under the CAA’s citizen suit provision, section 
304(a)(2);210 (2) ªling a petition for review with the court of appeals 
in the appropriate circuit under 307(b)(1) of the CAA;211 or (3) peti-
                                                                                                                      
203 Carey, 535 F.2d at 172 (quoting Train, 510 F.2d at 700). Additionally, the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted: 
[Section 304] reºects Congress’s recognition that “[c]itizens can be a useful 
instrument for detecting violations and bringing them to the attention of the 
enforcement agencies and courts alike.” It was designed to provide a proce-
dure permitting any citizen to bring an action directly against polluters violat-
ing the performance standards and emission restrictions imposed under the 
law or against the Administrator . . . . 
Train, 510 F.2d at 699–700 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
204 Train, 510 F.2d at 700. 
205 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 
(2000). 
206 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
207 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. 
208 Id. §§ 553(e), 701–706; Squillace & Wooley, supra note 180, at 464. 
209 These three approaches are discussed in greater detail in Part III.C. 
210 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000). 
211 Id. § 7607(b)(1). 
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tioning EPA directly to repeal the approval, and if unsuccessful, seek-
ing judicial review under the APA.212 Whichever method a plaintiff 
chooses as a means of getting into court, such an environmental jus-
tice suit will surely be challenged for lack of standing once there. 
B. Establishing Constitutional Standing to Sue 
 Issues of standing address “[w]hether a party has a sufªcient stake 
in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of 
that controversy.”213 While standing was once a highly liberal require-
ment, broadly interpreted by the courts, it recently has become a much 
more formidable obstacle for plaintiffs, in large part due to the Court’s 
decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.214 The standing obstacle is par-
ticularly burdensome in environmental cases where the harms are of-
ten abstract, and therefore not easily quantiªable.215
 To establish standing, four elements must be met:216 (1) the plain-
tiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”; (2) there must be some 
“fairly traceable” causation between the plaintiff’s injury and the de-
fendant’s action; (3) there must be a likelihood of redressability, should 
the court ªnd in favor of the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff must satisfy 
the prudential requirements, including third-party standing, general-
ized grievances, and the zone-of-interests requirement, which states that 
the plaintiff’s injury must be within the “zone of interests” protected by 
the statute.217 The Supreme Court has further held that the plaintiff 
has the burden of demonstrating each of these elements.218
                                                                                                                      
212 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e), 706. 
213 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). 
214 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
215 See, e.g., Jon Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition for Redress for the 
Environment, 7 Envtl. Law. 321, 326, 331 (2001). 
216 The ªrst three elements are constitutional requirements derived from the “Cases 
[and] Controversies” provisions of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 2; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. The fourth requirement consists of judicially imposed 
prudential restraints that may be modiªed or abrogated by Congress. See Bennett v. Spear, 
520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
217 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 
162; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
218 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 
establishing these elements.”); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
104 (1998); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167–68. 
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1. Injury in Fact 
 The ªrst element of standing requires that the plaintiff demon-
strate an “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized . . . 
and . . . actual or imminent,” as opposed to merely “conjectural or 
hypothetical.”219 This strict injury-in-fact requirement, as articulated 
in Lujan, has been tempered somewhat by the Court’s decision in 
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, in which the Court 
established that injury in fact could be satisªed by a showing that “aes-
thetic and recreational values . . . will be lessened by the challenged 
activity.”220
 Generally, the harms suffered by environmental justice plain-
tiffs—often including heightened safety risks, deteriorated health, 
and increased mortality rates—are not as abstract or unquantiªable as 
those of other environmental plaintiffs.221 Therefore, a plaintiff chal-
lenging SIP approval could likely satisfy injury in fact with a showing 
that approval of the SIP allows for siting and permitting that create 
imminent health risks, environmental harms, or aesthetic harms. 
2. Causation 
 Causation requires a showing that there exists “a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the conduct complained of.”222 In other 
words, the injury has to be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some 
third party not before the court.”223 The “fairly traceable” standard 
does not require proof to a scientiªc certainty; rather, according to at 
least one circuit, “circumstantial evidence such as proximity to pollut-
ing sources, predictions of discharge inºuence, and past pollution . . . 
prove both injury in fact and [causation].”224 As noted by the Court in 
                                                                                                                      
219 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Laidlaw, plaintiffs, 
who lived anywhere from within one-quarter mile to twenty miles of the defendant’s facility 
were found to have suffered injury in fact because they felt that due to the defendant’s 
discharges in the water, they could no longer use the North Tyger River for recreational 
purposes, such as ªshing, boating, birdwatching, hiking, and picnicking. Id. at 181–83. 
221 Compare South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460–68 (D.N.J. 2001) (detailing the 
alarming adverse health effects that disproportionate siting and permitting of environ-
mental hazards has had, and is projected to have, on the residents of Waterfront South), 
with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64 (alleging injury in fact based on an intent to visit the af-
fected ecosystem at some unspeciªed future date). 
222 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
223 Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
224 Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling, 204 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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Lujan, satisfying causation can be difªcult where the plaintiff is not 
the object of the government’s action, but rather suffers injury as a 
result of “the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else.”225
 Causation could prove to be a difªcult obstacle for a plaintiff 
challenging EPA approval of an allegedly invalid SIP, since the harm 
might be construed to be caused, not by EPA, but by a third party not 
before the court, that is, the actual polluter. Properly framed, how-
ever, the “conduct complained of,” or the “challenged action,” is ap-
proval of a SIP that has failed to provide the necessary assurances 
against disproportionate siting and permitting. The harm then—the 
adverse effects of disproportionate siting and permitting as allowed by 
the SIP—is fairly, if not directly, traceable to EPA’s approval decision. 
3. Redressability 
 To satisfy the redressability component of standing, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that it is likely—as opposed to merely speculative— 
that the plaintiff’s injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.226 
Like causation, redressability can be a more difªcult burden to satisfy 
where the plaintiff is not the object of government regulation.227 In-
deed, where the parties directly responsible for plaintiffs’ harms are 
not affected by a court’s ruling, redressability may be impossible to 
satisfy, as was the case in Lujan.228
 EPA, however, would be bound by a court’s ruling. Likewise, 
states are bound by the approval decisions of EPA.229 Therefore, a fa-
vorable decision to a challenge of SIP approval would be likely to re-
dress a plaintiff’s complaint, thereby negating the concerns of the Lu-
jan Court. 
                                                                                                                      
225 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62. 
226 Id. at 561. 
227 Id. at 561–62. 
228 The primary reason the plaintiffs in Lujan failed the redressability requirement was 
that the third parties that funded the projects to which plaintiffs objected were not neces-
sarily bound by any decree of the Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, Jr., whom the 
plaintiffs were suing. Therefore, any order of the Court imposed upon the Secretary would 
be unlikely to alter the third parties’ conduct, and would therefore, not redress the plain-
tiffs’ complaint. See id. at 568. 
229 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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4. Prudential Requirements 
 A plaintiff who satisªes the three constitutional standing re-
quirements will not be signiªcantly burdened by the prudential re-
quirements. The limitations on third-party standing230 and general-
ized grievances231 will generally not affect plaintiffs residing in low-
income and minority communities who challenge the disparate-
impacts of a SIP, since the alleged harms in such cases are neither suf-
fered solely by third parties nor by a large class of citizens.232
 The burden of satisfying the courts’ prudential requirements is 
further diminished—if not totally eliminated—for plaintiffs bringing 
action under section 304(a)(2) of the CAA. The Supreme Court has 
held that citizen suit provisions authorizing “any person” to com-
mence legal action, such as section 304(a)(2), are indicative of Con-
gress’s intent to establish the broadest possible zone of interests, lim-
ited only by the constitutional requirements of standing.233 
Accordingly, citizen suit provisions negate the prudential require-
ments altogether.234 Therefore, establishing constitutional standing 
would be sufªcient for the environmental justice plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                      
230 The limitations on third-party standing require that plaintiffs assert only their own 
rights and interests and not the rights and interests of others. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 499 (1975). 
231 The prohibition against generalized grievances precludes standing where the as-
serted harm is “shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.” Id. 
232 The harms alleged in the South Camden cases, for example, were limited to residents 
of the Waterfront South neighborhood, a community of 2132 individuals. South Camden I, 
145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (D.N.J. 2001). Given this relatively small number, and the fact 
that the suit was brought by the residents themselves and not by a third party, there were 
no problems with generalized grievances or third-party standing. See generally South Camden 
III, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (reaching a decision on the merits in each case, which 
necessarily required a ªnding that the threshold requirements of standing, both constitu-
tional and prudential, had been satisªed); South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 
2001); South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
233 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998); Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–66 (1997); see also Recht-
schaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 279; Rodgers, supra note 181, § 1.9, at 110. The 
language of the judicial review provisions of the APA is only slightly more restrictive than 
section 304(a)(2) of the CAA. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (“A person suffering legal wrong 
. . . or adversely affected . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). Section 307(b)(1) of 
the CAA is silent on who may petition for review. See William B. Johnson, Annotation, Con-
struction and Application of § 307(b)(1) of Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(1)) Pertaining to 
Judicial Review by Courts of Appeals, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 604, § 6 (1988). 
234 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3 (“We acknowledge . . . that Congress’ decision to 
grant a particular plaintiff the right to challenge an Act’s constitutionality . . . eliminates 
any prudential standing limitations . . . .”); see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 20; Bennett, 520 U.S. at 
164. 
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C. Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review in a 110(a)(2)(E) Challenge 
 The precise scope of citizens’ role and EPA’s duty in ensuring that 
SIPs are properly approved and enforced is not clearly deªned in the 
statute.235 Without question, EPA is “required to approve each State’s 
plan . . . if it satisªe[s] . . . conditions set forth in § 110(a)(2).”236 EPA’s 
duty is less clear, however, where a state’s plan does not totally satisfy 
the conditions of section 110(a)(2).237 EPA has the authority, for ex-
ample, to approve only certain portions of a SIP,238 or to condition ap-
proval on further legislative action by the state.239
 Given this broad discretion and lack of clear standards, a citizen 
plaintiff’s job is a difªcult one.240 Success undoubtedly will turn on 
how the arguments are framed. One must argue that SIP compliance 
with section 110(a)(2)(E) is as essential as any other provision of the 
CAA, including emission limitations. A plaintiff must convince a court 
that failure to provide necessary assurances of compliance with dispa-
rate-impact regulations is not within the scope of technical or sci-
entiªc issues to which EPA retains discretionary decisionmaking 
power. Rather, because these necessary assurances are required by 
section 110(a)(2), such a failure prohibits EPA from approving a SIP 
in its entirety. Any alternative “interpretation of the Clean Air Act . . . 
                                                                                                                      
235 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7604 (2000). 
236 Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 65 (1975). 
237 Some commentators have suggested that the Administrator has a nondiscretionary 
duty to disapprove SIPs that are not in compliance with section 110(a)(2). See Edward P. 
Murphy, Note, McCarthy v. Thomas: Are States Bound When Approval of an SIP Is Merely Con-
ditional?, 25 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 249, 257 n.60 (1995) (suggesting that “a citizen suit 
may be brought against the EPA for improperly approving a SIP”). Courts, however, have 
granted EPA considerable leeway in deciding whether to approve or disapprove SIPs. See, 
e.g., Conn. Fund for the Env’t, Inc. v. EPA, 696 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that 
EPA has “considerable discretion in deciding whether to approve a SIP or SIP revision”). 
238 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (“If a portion of the plan revision meets all the applicable 
requirements of this chapter, the Administrator may approve the plan revision in part and 
disapprove the plan revision in part.”). 
239 Id. § 7410(k)(4) (“The Administrator may approve a plan revision based on a 
commitment of the State to adopt speciªc enforceable measures by a date certain, but not 
later than 1 year after the date of approval of the plan revision.”). 
240 Indeed, the task of challenging SIP approval for failure to comply with section 
110(a)(2)(E) should not be underestimated. To date, EPA has never found a violation of 
Title VI regulations where a facility is otherwise in compliance with the CAA. E-mail from 
Robert R. Kuehn, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, to the author 
(Feb. 25, 2004, 17:05:41 EST) (on ªle with author). Perhaps the fact that SIP approval has 
never been tested on these grounds is evidence of just how difªcult the task is perceived to 
be. However, even if unsuccessful, there may be tremendous value in bringing an action. 
Even a losing suit would, at the very least, breathe much-needed life into the environ-
mental justice debate. 
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is contrary to the structure of the Act as a whole, and . . . if accepted, 
it would vitiate the public policy underlying the enactment . . . as set 
forth in the Act and in its legislative history.”241
 A plaintiff’s job is made more difªcult still by the burdens the 
court places on plaintiffs challenging SIP approval. Should a plaintiff 
choose to bring a civil action under either the judicial review provi-
sions of the APA,242 or the CAA’s petition for review of ªnal agency 
action provision,243 the agency’s decision will be reviewed under an 
“arbitrary or capricious” standard.244 Should the suit be brought un-
der the citizen suit provision of the CAA,245 the plaintiff will have only 
a slightly more enviable task of demonstrating that EPA’s approval vio-
lated a nondiscretionary duty of the Administrator.246 The burdens 
and standards of review applicable to each are discussed in the follow-
ing sections. 
1. Judicial Review Provisions of the APA 
 Under section 706(2)(A) of the APA, a reviewing court may over-
turn agency action in certain circumstances including, and of particu-
lar relevance to an environmental justice plaintiff, when such action is 
found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.”247 Unfortunately, the case law is not very 
clear as to exactly what this standard means or how it is to be ap-
plied.248 What is certain, however, is that while the standard of review 
is narrow,249 it is not one of total deference. 
 The Supreme Court has interpreted the “arbitrary or capricious” 
standard to require setting aside agency action where “the agency has 
                                                                                                                      
241 NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1976). 
242 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000). 
243 Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000). 
244 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 824 (5th Cir. 
2003); Sierra Club v. EPA, 314 F.3d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 2002). 
245 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000). 
246 See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
247 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
248 See 2 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Trea-
tise § 11.4, at 200 (3d ed. 1994). 
249 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
42–43 (1983). At least one circuit has suggested that, in defending against an “arbitrary or 
capricious” challenge, an agency may only need to demonstrate that it “examine[d] the 
relevant data and [can] articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Tourus Records, Inc. v. 
Drug Enforcement Admin., 259 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
634 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:599 
. . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
[or] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency.”250 When framed in this manner, the 
standard could be tremendously favorable to an environmental justice 
plaintiff. In light of EPA and OCR’s renewed commitment to envi-
ronmental justice, and Executive Order 12,898, which has instructed 
agencies to be more mindful of their section 602 duties,251 environ-
mental justice is clearly intended to be an “important aspect” of facil-
ity siting and permitting. Therefore, when EPA approves a SIP that 
does not provide necessary assurances of compliance with EPA’s dis-
parate-impact regulations, the action is arguably arbitrary and capri-
cious and must be set aside for “fail[ure] to consider an important 
aspect of the problem.”252 Likewise, where there is any indication that 
a SIP would potentially operate in violation of the disparate-impact 
regulations, an approval could be thought to “run counter to the evi-
dence before the agency.”253
 The APA’s judicial review provisions, however, contain several pit-
falls. First, a plaintiff generally may only obtain judicial review of an 
agency decision once administrative remedies have been exhausted.254 
This would require petitioning EPA directly to repeal or amend the ap-
proval prior to seeking review by a court.255 Additionally, the availability 
of judicial review may be limited by section 701(a)(2), which states that 
review is not afforded to action that is “committed to agency discretion 
by law.”256 The courts’ recent trend toward committing more action to 
agency discretion, thereby eroding the presumption of reviewability,257 
makes this exception a signiªcant concern for the environmental jus-
tice plaintiff. Finally, courts tend to defer to agency action, especially 
when a decision involves an “evaluation of complex scientiªc data 
within [the agency’s] technical expertise.”258 It could accordingly be 
                                                                                                                      
250 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
251 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
252 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
253 Id. 
254 Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 278–79. 
255 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
256 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). For further discussion on the scope of EPA’s discre-
tion, see infra discussion Part III.C.3. 
257 See 3 Davis & Pierce, supra note 248, § 17.7. There is, however, reason to believe that 
even action committed to agency discretion is reviewable, since section 706(2)(A) permits a 
court to set aside agency action where such action is found to be “an abuse of discretion.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000); see also 3 Davis & Pierce, supra note 248, § 17.6, at 131. 
258 See BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 824 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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argued that the dispersion of adverse impacts permitted by a particular 
SIP fall within this realm of agency expertise. 
2. Petition for Review of Final Agency Action: Section 307(b)(1) of 
the CAA 
 The “arbitrary or capricious” standard used to evaluate chal-
lenges to agency action brought under the APA is the same standard 
courts use in evaluating petitions for review of ªnal agency action 
brought under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA.259 Therefore, in order 
to prevail on the merits, a plaintiff would need to make the same ar-
guments as those discussed in the previous section, namely, that EPA 
has acted arbitrarily or capriciously by approving a SIP that fails to 
provide necessary assurances of the plan’s compliance with Title VI 
disparate-impact regulations. 
  Like the judicial review provisions of the APA, section 307(b)(1) 
contains rigid procedural requirements. The major procedural limita-
tion is that a plaintiff must ªle a petition for review with the court of 
appeals in the appropriate circuit within sixty days of SIP approval.260 
While the express grant of jurisdiction to the court of appeals may 
attract some plaintiffs,261 for others, the inºexibility of the sixty-day 
requirement may be a deterrent, if not an outright prohibition. Such 
plaintiffs would be better served by challenging SIP approval under 
the more ºexible citizen suit provisions of the CAA. 
3. Citizen Suit Provision of the CAA 
 Section 304(a)(2) of the CAA262 provides plaintiffs the greatest 
ºexibility in challenging SIP approval, though the outcome of such a 
suit is far from certain. A signiªcant advantage to section 304(a)(2) is 
that, unlike section 307(b)(1), there is no prescribed time limit within 
which action must commence.263 A potential drawback, however, is 
that primary jurisdiction for section 304 actions is speciªcally granted 
to the federal district courts, whereas primary jurisdiction for section 
                                                                                                                      
259 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000); e.g., BCCA Appeal Group, 355 F.3d at 824; Sierra Club 
v. EPA, 314 F.3d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 2002); see Squillace & Wooley, supra note 180, at 465. 
260 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
261 Indeed, section 307(b)(1) has proved to be a popular route for plaintiffs. See, e.g., 
Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985); Conn. Fund for the Env’t, Inc. v. 
EPA, 696 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1982); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1120 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
262 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000). 
263 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7604, with id. § 7607(b)(1). 
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307 actions is speciªcally granted to the local circuit court of ap-
peals.264 Therefore, when available, a plaintiff challenging SIP ap-
proval may often be best served by challenging approval on both 
grounds, as the courts have found that the circuit courts of appeals 
have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions.265
 A second advantage to section 304(a)(2) actions is that the stan-
dard of review is not the onerous “arbitrary or capricious” standard, as is 
the case with actions brought under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA and 
the judicial review provisions of the APA.266 Instead, a plaintiff will have 
to demonstrate that by approving the challenged SIP, the EPA Adminis-
trator failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty267—speciªcally, disap-
proving SIPs or portions thereof that fail to comply with the CAA. 
 Given the broad discretion courts have traditionally granted 
agency decisionmaking and SIP approval in particular, this is by no 
means an easy task. While courts have offered support for the idea that 
EPA does not have discretion to approve invalid SIPs, the precise scope 
of the Administrator’s nondiscretionary duty is not well-deªned, which 
has led to conºicting notions of what is required of the Administrator 
when deciding whether to approve a submitted SIP.268
 The nondiscretionary duty doctrine is most often applied to time-
sensitive decisions of the Administrator.269 For example, the Adminis-
trator has a nondiscretionary duty to publish reports and regulations 
by speciªed deadlines,270 and to make approval decisions on SIPs in a 
timely fashion.271 The Administrator also has a nondiscretionary duty 
                                                                                                                      
264 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), with id. § 7607(b)(1). 
265 E.g., Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 1996). 
266 See discussion supra Part III.C.1–2. 
267 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf—against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administra-
tor . . . .”). 
268 Compare Squillace & Wooley, supra note 180, at 472 (“[W]here the Administrator 
approves a SIP which violates the law one can say that the Administrator failed to perform 
his nondiscretionary duty to disapprove a SIP which violates the law.”), and Murphy, supra 
note 237, at 257 n.60 (suggesting that “a citizen suit may be brought against the EPA for 
improperly approving a SIP”), with Rodgers, supra note 181, § 3.4, at 185–88 (excluding 
disapproval of an invalid SIP from a list of recognized nondiscretionary duties, and noting 
the broad discretion granted by the courts to EPA regarding SIP approval decisions). 
269 See Rodgers, supra note 181, § 3.4, at 185–86. 
270 See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 797 F. Supp. 194, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (ªnding that the Ad-
ministrator has a “mandatory, nondiscretionary duty . . . to issue the required motor vehi-
cle inspection and maintenance guidance by [the speciªed deadline]”). 
271 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 271 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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to either approve or disapprove SIPs according to the plan’s compli-
ance with the requirements of section 110(a)(2).272 As to whether the 
requirements of section 110(a)(2) have actually been met, however, 
the Administrator retains considerable discretion.273 Therefore, while 
the Administrator’s decision as to compliance with section 110(a)(2) 
requirements can only be challenged as arbitrary or capricious,274 
once a ªnding of 110(a)(2) compliance or noncompliance has been 
made, the Administrator then has a nondiscretionary duty to approve 
or disapprove the SIP accordingly.275 A failure to approve or disap-
prove in accordance with the Administrator’s section 110(a)(2) de-
termination can thus be challenged under section 304(a)(2).276
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was one of the ªrst 
courts to analyze the distinction between the Administrator’s nondis-
cretionary SIP approval duties and the substantive discretion exer-
cised therein.277 In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, the court acknowl-
edged that “[t]he Administrator . . . retains a good deal of discretion as 
to the content of [a SIP approval] decision.”278 Speciªcally, the court 
noted that “the Administrator’s duty to approve a [SIP] revision de-
pends . . . on whether it satisªes the other general requirements of 
section 110(a)(2).”279 In the Kennecott case, the “other general re-
                                                                                                                      
[I]t is beyond dispute that EPA has a mandatory duty to determine . . . 
whether the states’ plans comply with the [Clean Air] Act . . . . A review of the 
precedent reveals that the existence of a non-discretionary duty to determine 
timely whether the states’ SIP’s comply with the Act has been viewed as almost 
axiomatic. 
Id. 
272 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2000) (using mandatory language to articulate SIP re-
quirements: “Each such plan shall . . . .” (emphasis added)); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1978). 
273 See Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1354. 
274 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Given the discretionary nature of this decision, a 
challenge to the substance of the Administrator’s decision would therefore best be 
brought under section 307(b)(1). See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
275 See Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1355. 
276 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000). 
277 Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1349. 
278 Id. at 1354 (emphasis added). Even such a discretionary decision, however, is not 
entirely exempt from judicial review, as the APA authorizes courts to overturn any agency 
action, including discretionary action, if it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); discussion supra 
Part III.C.1; see also Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1354–55. 
279 Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1354 (internal quotation marks omitted). Included 
among these “other general requirements” is of course a state’s section 110(a)(2)(E) duty to 
provide assurances that their plan will not operate in violation of valid federal law, such as 
EPA’s disparate-impact regulations. See supra Part II.A–B. 
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quirement” at issue was the mandatory inclusion of “emission limita-
tions” as required by section 110(a)(2)(B).280 In determining whether 
the emission limitations requirement was met, the court found that 
the Administrator was authorized to make a determination of “feasi-
bility.”281 Once that determination of feasibility was made, however, 
the court held that the Administrator then had a nondiscretionary duty 
to approve or disapprove the SIP accordingly.282
 The process outlined in Kennecott consists of two steps: ªrst, the 
Administrator must determine, within the Administrator’s discretion, 
whether the plan complies with the requirements of section 110(a)(2). 
Then, the Administrator must either approve or disapprove the SIP in 
accordance with this determination. In Kennecott, the Administrator 
properly exercised this discretion in determining that the plaintiff had 
not satisªed the “emission limitations” requirement articulated in sec-
tion 110(a)(2).283 Following this determination, however, EPA no 
longer had discretion to approve or disapprove this portion of the SIP, 
but rather, had to act in accordance with the Administrator’s deci-
sion.284 Implicitly, the Administrator also, therefore, did not have dis-
cretion to approve a SIP that did not include any emission controls, 
because such an omission would have been a per se violation of the 
“other general requirements of section 110(a)(2).”285
 Similarly, one might argue that, with respect to section 
110(a)(2)(E), the Administrator’s discretion is limited to a determi-
                                                                                                                      
280 Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1354; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2000). 
281 Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1354. “Feasibility” may not be the best word 
choice to describe this discretionary power—just two years earlier the Supreme Court may 
have implicitly found that EPA could not consider economic or technological feasibility in 
determining whether to approve a SIP. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257–58 
(1976). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, recognizing this potential 
conºict, distinguished Kennecott on the basis that the general language in Union Electric—
suggesting that EPA may never consider feasibility in deciding whether to approve a SIP—
was limited to the context of that case, namely, that “economic or technological feasibility 
could not be used to invalidate an SIP which imposed stricter standards than those set by 
the EPA for national ambient air quality.” Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1356. Feasibil-
ity could implicitly, however, be used by EPA in determining whether a state had ade-
quately satisªed its section 110(a)(2) obligations. See id. at 1354; see also Union Electric, 437 
U.S. at 257–58. 
282 Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1355 (“Once the Administrator . . . has deter-
mined that the revised SIP either does or does not meet all the requirements of 
§ 110(a)(2) there is a nondiscretionary duty to act in accordance with his determina-
tion.”). 
283 Id. at 1354. 
284 Id. at 1355. 
285 See id. at 1354. 
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nation of whether a state’s “necessary assurances” will effectuate EPA’s 
Title VI disparate-impact regulations. Therefore, where the Adminis-
trator has found inadequate assurances of compliance with EPA’s Title 
VI regulations, the Administrator has a nondiscretionary duty to dis-
approve the SIP. Likewise, where such necessary assurances are absent 
altogether, the Administrator may not approve the SIP, because such 
an omission would be a per se violation of section 110(a)(2)(E).286
D. Policy Arguments in Support of Allowing 110(a)(2)(E) Challenges 
 In addition to the substantive arguments in support of allowing 
challenges to SIPs that fail to provide necessary assurances of compli-
ance with EPA’s disparate-impact regulations, there are strong policy 
arguments to be made as well. Allowing private enforcement of sec-
tion 110(a)(2)(E) preserves Congress’s intent to supplement the en-
forcement process through citizen participation, and it encourages 
increased vigilance by government agencies charged with enforcing 
CAA provisions.287
 Of course, this policy argument leads to the counterargument 
that Congress restricted jurisdiction to challenges of the Administra-
tor’s nondiscretionary duty as a means of insulating EPA from an ex-
cess of citizen challenges and to prevent an overburdened judiciary.288 
It can, and should be argued, however, that there is a particularly 
compelling interest for allowing challenges to SIPs that fail to provide 
necessary assurances of their compliance with disparate-impact regu-
lations. 
 First, in light of the Sandoval decision eliminating the private 
right of action to enforce the regulations289 and implicitly eliminating 
the use of § 1983,290 statutory handles such as section 110(a)(2)(E) 
                                                                                                                      
286 The obvious counterargument to this is that, while section 110(a)(2) explicitly re-
quires that SIPs include emission control measures, there is no such explicit requirement 
for disparate-impact compliance. Rather, the requirement is only implied, as EPA’s dispa-
rate-impact regulations are merely among the “valid federal law[s]” with which SIPs must 
comply under section 110(a)(2)(E). See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000). 
287 See S. Rep. No. 91–1196, at 36–37 (1970); supra notes 198–203 and accompanying 
text. 
288 See Kennecott Copper Corp., 572 F.2d at 1353. “[T]he non-discretionary duty require-
ment imposed by § 304 must be read in light of the Congressional intent to use this phrase 
to limit the number of citizen suits which could be brought against the Administrator and 
to lessen the disruption of the Act’s complex administrative process.” Id. (noting also the 
legislative history of the CAA citizen suit provision). 
289 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra notes 134, 162 and accompanying text. 
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may very well be the only means of enforcing EPA’s disparate-impact 
regulations. However, while this policy argument may prevail among 
the lower courts, the fact that the Supreme Court has strongly hinted 
at the invalidity of disparate-impact regulations291 makes this argu-
ment a tough sell in front of the Sandoval majority. 
 Second, to the extent that disparate-impact regulations further 
environmental justice, enforcement of the regulations should be of 
great concern to the executive branch of the government. Executive 
Order 12,898 instructed every federal agency to “make achieving envi-
ronmental justice part of its mission.”292 In the accompanying memo-
randum, President Clinton instructed EPA to ensure that, in reviewing 
proposed actions, the involved agency “has fully analyzed environ-
mental effects on minority communities and low-income communities, 
including human health, social, and economic effects.”293 Additionally, 
in 2001, then-Administrator Christine Todd Whitman afªrmed EPA’s 
strong commitment to environmental justice and the need to integrate 
its objectives into current programs and policies.294 Clearly, if environ-
mental justice is of such great concern to the federal government, then 
citizen suits brought in its interest can hardly be lumped together with 
the frivolous challenges Congress sought to block when enacting the 
nondiscretionary duty provision.295
Conclusion 
 The environmental justice movement, predicated on the notion 
that environmental harms should not be suffered disproportionately 
by low-income and minority communities, generated much of its ini-
tial momentum through citizen action and litigation. With the growth 
of the movement came increased environmental justice regulation, 
including EPA’s disparate-impact regulations. Those regulations, en-
acted pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, proscribe 
recipients of federal funding from engaging in actions that create ra-
                                                                                                                      
291 See supra text accompanying notes 135–38. 
292 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
293 Rechtschaffen & Gauna, supra note 48, at 397. 
294 See La Londe, supra note 62, at 38 n.76. 
295 It should be noted, however, that one administration’s commitment to its own ex-
ecutive order cannot necessarily be implied to the next administration. Indeed, in light of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, it could be difªcult to persuade a court that Execu-
tive Order 12,898 continues to speak for the current administration’s priorities. Former 
Administrator Whitman’s comments are perhaps more persuasive, as she was an appointee 
of the current administration. 
2005] Disparate Impact Rules and EJ Clean Air Suits 641 
cially discriminatory effects. Courts, such as the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit and the District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
were in turn asked to ªnd an implied private right of action to en-
force these disparate-impact regulations. 
 While early success suggested a promising future for the move-
ment, environmental justice has stalled in recent years due to judicial 
decisions severely limiting individuals’ ability to commence private 
actions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval implic-
itly overruled those lower court decisions by ªnding that no implied 
right of action exists to privately enforce EPA’s disparate-impact regu-
lations. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
determined that the Sandoval decision had implicitly foreclosed en-
forcement of the regulations through § 1983 as well. 
 These decisions, coupled with the Sandoval majority’s suggestions 
that disparate-impact regulations may be invalid altogether, led many 
to believe that there no longer existed a potential for private envi-
ronmental justice litigation. Instead, the frequently inefªcient, and 
almost always ineffective, administrative enforcement procedures 
were presumed to be complainants’ sole recourse. 
 However, this simply is not the case. Although Sandoval elimi-
nated the private right of action for enforcement of EPA’s disparate-
impact regulations, these regulations still remain valid federal law, 
despite the Sandoval Court’s ill-founded assertions to the contrary. 
Therefore, private enforcement of EPA’s disparate-impact regulations 
is still possible through the application of novel legal arguments. 
 One of the clearest statutory handles for enforcement of EPA’s 
disparate-impact regulations can be found in section 110(a)(2)(E) of 
the Clean Air Act. Its requirement that states provide necessary assur-
ances that their SIPs will not operate in violation of any provision of 
federal law means that, as a condition of approval, states must 
afªrmatively demonstrate how their plans comply with EPA’s disparate-
impact regulations. Where states provide no such assurances, inade-
quate assurances, or where there is indication that the plan will violate 
EPA’s disparate-impact regulations, the Administrator has a nondiscre-
tionary duty to reject the plan to the extent it violates these regulations. 
 Complex practical issues are involved in challenging approval of 
SIPs that have not provided these requisite assurances. Although a 
plaintiff has at least three avenues to challenge approval, the best 
choice would likely be to attempt as many as possible. Joining a sec-
tion 304(a)(2) claim with a 307(b)(1) claim, for example, would give 
a plaintiff the beneªt of a direct path to a court of appeals as well as a 
more forgiving standard of review. Although defeating a standing 
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challenge may be easier for an environmental justice plaintiff than for 
traditional environmental plaintiffs, success on the merits of the suit 
will likely be more difªcult. The necessary arguments essentially re-
duce to the claim that, because the Administrator has a nondiscre-
tionary duty to disapprove SIP proposals which do not provide neces-
sary assurances of their compliance with EPA’s disparate-impact 
regulations—thereby violating the provisions of section 110(a)(2)— 
EPA has acted either in violation of its nondiscretionary duty or arbi-
trarily and capriciously in approving such SIPs. More speciªcally, 
where a state cannot or chooses not to provide a detailed demonstra-
tion that its plan will not create racially discriminatory effects, EPA 
cannot make a reasoned judgment as to the plan’s compliance with 
the CAA. Therefore, should EPA approve such a plan, a plaintiff 
would have grounds to challenge the decision based on the SIP’s fail-
ure to comply with the CAA. Despite the clear obstacles to challeng-
ing SIP approval under section 110(a)(2)(E), a plaintiff should not be 
discouraged from doing so, for there are ample statutory provisions, 
precedent, and policy waiting for someone to leverage them in pur-
suit of environmental justice. 
